The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the ot...
Guardado en:
Autores principales: | , |
---|---|
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
2011
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006 |
Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|