The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the ot...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
2011
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006 |
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| Sumario: | In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. |
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