The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the ot...

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Autores principales: Mukherjee,Arijit, Wang,Leonard F.S
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios 2011
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Acceso en línea:http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006
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spelling oai:scielo:S0718-272420110004000062012-02-03The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D TournamentMukherjee,ArijitWang,Leonard F.S R & D tournament excessive entry insufficient entry In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y NegociosJournal of technology management & innovation v.6 n.4 20112011-12-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006en10.4067/S0718-27242011000400006
institution Scielo Chile
collection Scielo Chile
language English
topic R & D tournament
excessive entry
insufficient entry
spellingShingle R & D tournament
excessive entry
insufficient entry
Mukherjee,Arijit
Wang,Leonard F.S
The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
description In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.
author Mukherjee,Arijit
Wang,Leonard F.S
author_facet Mukherjee,Arijit
Wang,Leonard F.S
author_sort Mukherjee,Arijit
title The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_short The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_full The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_fullStr The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_full_unstemmed The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
title_sort winner curse and social inefficiency: double whammy of r&d tournament
publisher Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
publishDate 2011
url http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006
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