The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the ot...
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Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
2011
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oai:scielo:S0718-272420110004000062012-02-03The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D TournamentMukherjee,ArijitWang,Leonard F.S R & D tournament excessive entry insufficient entry In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUniversidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y NegociosJournal of technology management & innovation v.6 n.4 20112011-12-01text/htmlhttp://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006en10.4067/S0718-27242011000400006 |
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Scielo Chile |
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language |
English |
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R & D tournament excessive entry insufficient entry |
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R & D tournament excessive entry insufficient entry Mukherjee,Arijit Wang,Leonard F.S The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament |
description |
In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. |
author |
Mukherjee,Arijit Wang,Leonard F.S |
author_facet |
Mukherjee,Arijit Wang,Leonard F.S |
author_sort |
Mukherjee,Arijit |
title |
The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament |
title_short |
The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament |
title_full |
The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament |
title_fullStr |
The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament |
title_sort |
winner curse and social inefficiency: double whammy of r&d tournament |
publisher |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios |
publishDate |
2011 |
url |
http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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