The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the ot...

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Autores principales: Mukherjee,Arijit, Wang,Leonard F.S
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Universidad Alberto Hurtado. Facultad de Economía y Negocios 2011
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Acceso en línea:http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-27242011000400006
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