Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, coll...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad de Chile. Departamento de Economía
2013
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-52862013000200006 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|